C
alls for increased international co-operation and co-ordination of national economic policies are at the centre of the debate on reform of the world monetary system. There are three main proposals that have been under discussion for several years: Robert McKinnon's idea of stabilising exchange rates by means of coordinated management of the world money supply, 1 the target zones model advocated and refined primarily by John Williamson 2 and the proposal to co-ordinate economic policy on the basis of so-called objective indicators. 3
Much less attention has been paid to the proposal to establish a system of fixed exchange rates among the major industrial countries along the lines of the European Monetary System (EMS). This solution has recently been considered politically as a possible option, 4 but it has not yet been subjected to more systematic economic analysis. Although the success of the EMS is now generally acknowledged, the idea of a worldwide system of fixed exchange rates is usually dismissed out of hand. s
The bad memories of the time of the Bretton Woods system are undoubtedly the primary reason for the widespread rejection of an international system of fixed exchange rates, which is generally regarded as a "return to Bretton Woods". However, the following analysis shows that a world monetary system modelled on the EMS would differ markedly from the Bretton Woods system both institutionally and in the manner of its operation. Some of the usual objections to a fixed rate system on a world scale would therefore no longer apply, while other problems would increase in importance.
To illustrate how an international system of fixed exchange rates along the lines of the EMS would operate, the following article will assume a trilateral currency system (TCS) comprising the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the Deutsche Mark, the three most important trading, financial and reserve currencies. Restricting a new monetary system to the United States, Japan and Germany in the sense of a "key currency" system also appears to be a particularly efficient solution from the administrative point of view. 6
Since the financial markets in the United States, Germany and more recently in Japan too have been completely liberalised, a TCS would be a system of fixed exchange rates with complete freedom of movement of money and capital from the very outset; to that extent it would differ markedly from the EMS, not only as it was in its initial phase but also as it is now. In an EMS-styte monetary system the three countries would base their intervention obligations on a grid of bilateral central rates among their currencies. The structure of such a parity grid standard is fundamentally different from that of the Bretton Woods system, in which the par values of all currencies were fixed only against the dollar, without there being any central rate for the dollar vis-a.-vis any other currency (key currency standard). All three participating central banks would be obliged to keep the bilateral exchange rates of their currencies within set bands of fluctuation. Whereas in the EMS the band widths are 2.25 % on either side of the central rates, consideration would have to be given to setting wider fluctuation bands in a fixed rate system involving the world's three major investment currencies, at least in the initial phase. This would be an important prerequisite for avoiding currency crises as far as possible (see below). In Table 1 band widths of +5% around the hypothetical central rate have therefore been assumed.
A fundamental question that arises when establishing a fixed rate system concerns the level at which central rates should be set. Opponents of fixed exchange rates unfailingly point out that there are serious problems with all known methods of determining equilibrium exchange rates. It is true that there is no satisfactory way of calculating the "correct" exchange rate; at best, it might be possible to take a "consensus forecast", consisting of the average of the results obtained from different estimation procedures. 7 A look back at the initial phase of the EMS indicates a possible solution. At that time the parity grid was not based on equilibrium exchange rates obtained from model estimations; instead, the prevailing bilateral central rates for the currencies of the "snake" (Deutsche Mark, Belgian franc, Danish krone and Dutch guilder) were adopted for the new system and the 5 The following reasoning of the Group of Ten is typical of many pronouncements: "While useful lessons can be drawn from the experience of the EMS as regards the promotion of policy convergence and exchange rate stability, the Deputies recognize that the system cannot be dissociated from the particular political and economic environment in which it operates and therefore cannot be readily extended to a broader and more heterogeneous context characterized by the presence of a number of reserve currencies. Such a system would run a much greater risk of being exposed to pressures similar to those which arose in the final phase of the par value system." Group ofTen: The Functioning of the International Monetary System, in: IMF Survey, Supplement on the Fund, Vol. 14 (July 1985), paragraph 24.
See also JacobA. were taken as new central rates. As the intention of the major industrial countries to stabilise exchange rates at around the current level has been repeatedly re-affirmed since the Louvre Accord, it should not prove an insuperable problem to determine the initial exchange rates in aTCS. 8
As in the EMS, the agreement should make provision for changes in central rates so that this adjustment option is available in the event of substantial macroeconomic divergences. Given the design of the parity grid, realignments would require the prior agreement of all the parties involved; unilateral parity changes as in the Bretton Woods system would not be possible.
Intervention and Settlement Rules
The central banks would be obliged to make unlimited interventions at the upper and lower intervention points of the parity grid (so-called compulsory interventions).
In the example shown in Table 1 , the minimum dollar exchange rate at which the Deutsche Bundesbank would have to buy dollars for DM would be DM 1.615 to the dollar. This would correspond to a maximum DM rate of $ 0.62 to the DM, at which the Federal Reserve System would have to sell DM for dollars. In other words, both central banks would be required to buy dollars against DM when the minimum dollar rate (maximum DM rate) was reached. To this extent a parity grid standard establishes a formal symmetry of intervention obligations, whereas with a key currency standard like the Bretton Woods system only the non-key-currency countries are obliged to intervene in relation to the key currency (the US dollar). 9
As in the EMS, steps would have to be taken to ensure that in the new TCS the central banks of weak currency countries had sufficient funds in the strong currency to 
